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INTRODUCTION TO CERTAIN MEMBERS OF
THE FEDERAL QUESTION FAMILYt
WILLIAM B. AycocIK*
"[A] page of history is worth a volume of logic."
Justice Holmes in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner'
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal question jurisdiction in its original and appellate form in-
volves cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the
United States. When compared to other classes of federal jurisdiction-
such as diversity of citizenship, admiralty, and the United States as a
party-federal question jurisdiction may be regarded as an entity, but
when considered alone, federal question jurisdiction does not lend itself
to a unitary approach. All federal questions do not "arise" the same
way. Thus there is no uniform test for invoking all federal question juris-
diction. Federal questions, appropriately, can be treated as a family.
Like other families there are differences between, as well as similarities
among, its various members. The most complex member of this family
is the "general federal question" jurisdiction arising under the Act of
1875.2 However, long before this Act was passed, Congress fathered
t This article was prepared in cooperation with the North Carolina Law Center
and with the assistance of John W. Dees, second year law student.
* Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
1256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (tax case). "The history of the federal courts is
woven into the history of the times. The factors in our national life which came in
with reconstruction are the same factors which increased the business of the federal
courts, enlarged their jursdiction, modified and expanded their structure." F.
FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 59 (1927).
'Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 now 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a)
(1964). 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §22
(Wright ed. 1960); ALT, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1311 & Commentary at 169-87 (1969) ; C. WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS ch. 3 (2d ed. 1970) ; Williard, When Does a Case "Arise"
under Federal Laws?, 45 Am. L. REV. 373 (1911); Forrester, The Nature of a
"Federal Qwstion," 16 TUL. L. REv. 362 (1942); Chadbourn & Levin, Original
Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 639 (1942) ; Forrester, Federal
Question Jurisdiction and Section 5, 16 TUL. L. REV. 263 (1942); Note, Proposed
Revision of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 40 ILL. L. REv. 387 (1945); Bergman,
Reappraisal of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 46 MIcHr. L. REv. 17 (1947) ; Fraser,
Some Problems in Federal Question Jurisdiction, 49 MICH. L. REV. 73 (1950):
Mishkin, The Federal "Qtestion" in the District Courts, 53 CoLuM. L. REV. 157(1953); London, "Federal Question" Jurisdiction-A Snare and a Delusion, 57
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several other members of the federal question family. Among them are
federal questions decided in a state court subject to appellate review by
the United States Supreme Court, special federal question jurisdiction
to enforce federally-created rights, federal charter jurisdiction, special
federal question jurisdiction providing for removal of cases by federal
officers from the state courts to the federal courts, and the Civil Rights
Act of 1871. Each of these selected members of the family will be dis-
cussed before considering the Act of 1875.
All members of the family treated herein can trace their ancestry
through some act of Congress to the first clause in article III, section 2
of the United States Constitution which provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority. (Em-
phasis added.)
This clause enables Congress to confer original jurisdiction on federal
courts below the Supreme Court3 and, when coupled with the Supremacy
Clause,4 authorizes Congress to confer federal question jurisdiction on
the state courts. Further, article III, section 2, clause 2 enables Congress
to provide for appellate jurisdiction of federal questions decided by state
courts as well as those which originate in the lower federal courts. In
the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress conferred exclusiveu jurisdiction on
the lower federal courts over federal criminal offenses, but those courts
were not given jurisdiction to try civil cases "arising" under the Con-
stitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.'
MicE. L. REv. 835 (1959); Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that
a Case Arise "Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 890 (1967).
' The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is set forth in article III, § 2,
cl. 2 of the Constitution: "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Min-
isters and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court
shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the
Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." The
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be enlarged or restricted by
Congress. However, Congress may provide for the district courts to share this
jurisdiction with the Supreme Court. For example: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345-1346 (1964).
"'This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 3, 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76, 79.
8 Lower federal courts in the exercise of diversity jurisdiction conferred on them
[Vol. 49
FEDERAL QUESTION FAMILY
Federal Questions in State Courts
Although Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not expressly
confer federal question jurisdiction on the state courts, it was clearly
contemplated that such jurisdiction would be exercised: Justice Story
observed that the Supremacy Clause was an indication that the framers
of the Constitution contemplated that cases "within the judicial cog-
nizance of the United States not only might but would arise in the
state courts, in the exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction."7
Congress in section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 17898 provided for
appellate review by the United States Supreme Court of state court
decisions holding some federal act or treaty invalid or upholding the
validity of a state act against a claim based on the Constitution, treaties,
or laws of the United States. Subsequent legislation9 has broadened
the scope of section 25 by authorizing review by certiorari whether a
state court decides for or against the federal claim. The current statute
is as follows:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State
in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court
as follows:
by the Judiciary Act of 1789 may decide federal questions involving the validity of
state statutes. Collet v. Collet, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 294 (1792). Warren, Earliest
Cases of Judicial Review of State Legislation by Federal Courts, 32 YALE L.J. 15
(1922).
"Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 340 (1816).
'Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85.
And be it further enacted, That a final judgment or decree in any suit, in
the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit
could be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute
of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is
against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute
of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being
repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and
the decision is in favour of such their validity, (d) [sic] or where is drawn
in question the construction of any clause of the constitution, or of a treaty,
or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the decision
is against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed
by either party, under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute
or commission, may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the
Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error .... (Emphasis
added)
In asserting authority of the Supreme Court to have the final word in federal
question cases originating in the state courts, Justice Story said: "[T]he whole
judicial power of the United States should be, at all times, vested either in an
original or appellate form, in some courts created under its authority." Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 331 (1816).
'Act of December 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790; Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28,
§ 2, 14 Stat. 386.
19701
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
(1) By appeal where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty
or statute of the United States and the decision is against its validity.
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute
of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its
validity.
(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute
of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a
State statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant
to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or where any
title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under
the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority
exercised under, the United States. 10
In 1821 Chief Justice Marshall writing for the Court in the case of
Cokens v. Virginia" -- which had come to the Court on a writ of error
to a judgment rendered by the Court of Hustings for the borough of
Norfolk, Virginia-stated:
A case in law or equity consists of the right of one party, as well as of
the other, and may truly be said to arise under the constitution or a law
of the United States, whenever its correct decision depends on the
construction of either. Congress seems to have intended to give its
own construction of this part of the constitution in the 25th section of
the judiciary act; and we perceive no reasons to depart from that con-
struction.12
No particular form of words of phrases is essential to raise the federal
question in the state courts. If the "record" as a whole shows either
expressly or by clear intent that the question was raised, the federal
claim is to be regarded as having been adequately presented.'8 Whether
a federal question was sufficiently and properly raised in the state courts
is itself ultimately a federal question, and the Supreme Court is not
bound by the decision of the state courts. 14 And when the highest court
of a state passes on the federal question, there can be no doubt as to its
proper presentation in the state court."5 In order for the Supreme Court
to review a federal question arising in a state court, the question must
1028 U.S.C. § 1257 (1964).
" 19 U.S. 120, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821).
I2 d. at 170, 6 Wheat. at 379.New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 67 (1928).
14 Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
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have been the basis of a final judgment by the highest court of the state
authorized under state law to hear the case.
The federal questions decided in state courts constitute an important
member of the federal question family. Although the focus of this
article is on how and when federal questions arise in the federal courts,
constant reference will be made by way of comparison to federal question
jurisdiction exercised by the state courts.'
II. SPECIAL FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION-FEDERALLY-
CREATED CAUSES OF ACTION
If Congress creates a cause of action, the plaintiff's claim arises under
a federal law; thus Congress can vest jurisdiction in the federal courts
to litigate that claim. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "the
judicial power of every well-constituted government must be co-
extensive with the legislative, and must be capable of deciding every
judicial question which grows out of the constitution and laws."1 7
Further, under the Supremacy Clause, Congress may confer jurisdiction
on the state courts to enforce federal rights."8 In allocating jurisdiction
over federally-created causes of action, Congress has exercised its option
in a variety of ways. In some instances jurisdiction is vested in the
"o For a more detailed treatment of Supreme Court review of state court de-
cisions, see R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRAcTIcE ch. 3 (4th ed.
1969); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 107 (2d ed. 1970). Alexander
Hamilton suggested the possibility that inferior federal courts should be given
authority to review state court decisions on federal questions. THE FEDERALIST No.
82. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 authorizes a federal district judge to issue
the writ when a person is held by a state in violation of the supreme law of the
land. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3) (1964). In passing on the Habeas Corpus Act of
1867, the Supreme Court has stated:
[A]s the judicial power of the nation extends to all cases arising under the
Constitution, the laws and treaties of the United States; as the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended unless when in cases of
rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it; and as Congress has
power to pass all laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the
powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States
or in any department or officer thereof; no doubt can exist as to the power
of Congress thus to enlarge the jurisdiction of the courts of the Union and of
their justices and judges. That the petitioner is held under the authority
of a State cannot affect the question of the power or jurisdiction of the Circuit
Court to inquire into the cause of his commitment, and to discharge him if
he be restrained of his liberty in violation of the Constitution.
Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 249 (1886).
1 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 120, 172, 6 Wheat. 264, 384 (1821).
18Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
federal courts exclusive' of state courts, but typically jurisdiction is
vested concurrently 0 in the federal and state courts. Where concurrent
jurisdiction is conferred, Congress may preclude removal from the state
court to the federal court,2 ' or it may require a jurisdictional amount
for removal2 where none is required for original jurisdiction in the
federal courts.
The Court has construed broadly the powers of Congress to create
federal causes of action and to provide jurisdiction in the federal courts
to enforce these rights. However, with rare exception,23 the Court
has insisted that Congress express clearly its intent to do so. When the
language of Congress is equivocal, the Court is not inclined to construe
it to create a cause of action or to confer federal question jurisdiction
on the federal courts. To illustrate, in 187224 Congress enacted a
mining law in which it authorized an adverse suit in a "court of
competent jurisdiction." This Act further provided that the right of
possession could be determined "by local customs or rules of miners
in the several mining districts, so far as the same are applicable and
not inconsistent with the laws of the United States." In Shoshone
Mining Co. v. Rutter,5 the Court considered whether Congress intended
by this language to vest jurisdiction in the federal courts to litigate these
adverse suits. The Court held that Congress did not so intend and
pointed out:
A statute authorizing an action to establish a right is very different
from one which creates a right to be established. An action brought
under the one may involve no controversy as to the scope and effect of
the statute, while in the other case it necessarily involves such a con-
"
9 E.g., "[A]ll matters and proceedings in bankruptcy" (but not including
plenary actions by or against the representative of an estate, usually the trustee),
28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1964); cases arising under the patent and copyright laws,
28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1964).
20 E.g., Actions on "bond[s] executed under any law of the United States," 29
U.S.C. § 1352 (1964) ; The Federal Employers Liability Act (rights of action for
injury or death of railway employees), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964) ; the Jones Act
(rights of action for injury or death of seamen), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
"E.g., The Federal Employers Liability Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (a) (1964).
" E.g., suits against common carriers to recover damages for delay, loss, or
injury to shipments must exceed $3,000, 28 U.S.C. § 1445(b) (1964).
" Discussed pp. 12-17 infra.
" Act of May 10, 1872, REv. STAT. § 2326, at 429 (1875). Article IV, § 3, cl. 2
of the Constitution gives Congress power to dispose of and make all needful rules
and resolutions respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United
States.
"177 U.S. 505 (1900).
[Vol. 49
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troversy, for the thing to be decided is the extent of the right given by
the statute.20
The Court further held that Congress did not create any new juris-
dictional grant by employing the words "court of competent juris-
diction." Since there was no basis for federal jurisdiction under any
other statute,2 7 plaintiff's only recourse was to go to a state court.
Congress began early creating federal causes of action and conferring
jurisdiction on the federal courts to enforce federally-created rights.
This process, of course, goes on. The patent law was among the first
products of the process, and a brief examination of it will reveal how and
when a case arises under a special act which both creates the cause of
action and provides for federal jurisdiction. 28
Patents
The Constitution provides that the Congress shall have power:
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.29
In 1790O3 Congress passed "An Act to promote the progress of useful
Arts" in which provision was made for a patentee to sue for damages
for infringement. This Act was repealed when a broader statute was
enacted in 1793.1 The new statute provided that a patentee could
"' Id. at 510. See Judge Amidon's discussion in McGoon v. Northern Pac. Ry.,
204 F. 998 (D.N.D. 1913).
"' There was no diversity of citizenship. See pp. 30-31 infra for a discussion of
this case showing that there was no jurisdiction under the Act of 1875.
. Currently a jurisdictional statute may be broad enough to include many acts
of Congress: 28 U.S.C. § 137 (1964) ("The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress
regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and
monopolies."); 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1964) ("The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating
to patents, copyrights and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the
courts of the states in patent and copyright cases.").
29 U.S. COIST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
" Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.
1 Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 5, 1 Stat. 318.
And be it further enacted, That if any person shall make, devise and use, or
sell the thing so invented, the exclusive right of which shall, as aforesaid,
have been secured to any person by patent, without the consent of the
patentee, his executors, administrators or assigns, first obtained in writing,
every person so offending, shall forfeit and pay to the patentee, a sum, that
shall be at least equal to three times the price, for which the patentee has
usually sold or licensed to other persons, the use of the said invention;
19701
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sue for infringement and recover treble damages "in the circuit court
of the United States, or any other court having competent juris-
diction." The latter clause meant state courts ;32 and, thus, at this time
there was concurrent jurisdiction in the federal and state courts of patent
infringement suits. Subsequent patent laws eliminated the words "or
any other court having competent jurisdiction," and in 1870 Congress
expressly provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction of "all cases arising
under the patent-right or copyright laws of the United States. ' 4 This
provision for exclusive jurisdiction remains in effect. 5 Congress from
the beginning created a federal cause of action for patent infringement
and provided specifically for federal jurisdiction.
The current patent statute provides that a patentee shall have a
remedy by civil action for "infringement" of his patent." Remedies
specified in this statute include damages and injunctive relief." In a
civil action for infringement a patentee can invoke the jurisdiction of the
federal courts by making a good faith allegation of infringement in his
complaint. Such civil action arises under the patent laws.", Congress
also has provided that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined
which may be recovered in an action on the case founded on this act, in the
circuit court of the United States, or any other court having competent
jurisdiction.
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 140 (1876).
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 8 55, 16 Stat. 206; Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 359,
§ 17, 5 Stat. 124; Act of February 15, 1819, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481; Act of April 17,
1800, ch. 25, § 3, 2 Stat. 38.
"Act of July 8, 1870, REv. STAT. § 711, at 135 (1875).
Thus, the first patent law for securing to inventors their discoveries and in-
ventions, which was passed in 1793, [sic] gave treble damages for an in-
fringement, to be recovered in an action on the cases founded on the statute
in the Circuit Court of the United States, "or any other court having com-
petent jurisdiction,"--meaning, of course, the State courts. The subsequent
acts on the same subject were couched in such terms with regard to the
jurisdiction of the circuit courts as to imply that it was exclusive of the
State courts; and now it is expressly made so.
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 139-40 (1876).
"28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1964).
35 U.S.C. § 281 (1964).
3735 U.S.C. §283 (1964).
" [A] federal district court is held to have jurisdiction of a suit by a patentee
for an injunction against infringement and for profits and damages, even
though, in anticipation of a defense of a license or authority to use the patent,
the complainant includes in his bill averments intended to defeat such a
defense. If these averments do not defeat such defense, the patentee will
lose his case on the merits, but the court's jurisdiction under the patent laws
is not ousted.
Luckett v. Delpart, Inc., 270 U.S. 496, 510 (1926).
[Vol. 49
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with a "substantial and related claim" under the patent, copyright, or
trade-mark laws."
A suit cannot arise under the patent law by way of the answer to the
complaint. On the other hand, if the plaintiff alleges a claim arising
under the patent laws, jurisdiction is not defeated by defendant's plea
denying the merits of plaintiff's claim.40 Likewise, the federal court
does not lose jurisdiction to decide plaintiff's claim where the defendant
does not question the validity of the patent and the defense is based
exclusively on the contention that the defendant has not violated the
rights of the plaintiff.
41
The foregoing rules work well for a patentee who has a good faith
claim for infringement. But what about an alleged infringer who desires
to prove that he was innocent of the accusation? In the absence of
diversity of citizenship, an alleged infringer could not get into the
federal courts prior to the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 because his
suit did not arise under the patent laws.42 This hiatus has apparently
been closed inasmuch as alleged infringers have been permitted by some
lower federal courts to utilize the declaratory judgment device to sue
for a declaration of non-infringement or invalidity of the patent as well
as for an injunction against wrongful charges of infringement. The
complaint of the alleged infringer, according to these courts, presents a
controversy as to the validity of a patent and, therefore, arises under the
patent laws.
43
A patentee does not have an open door to litigate in the federal courts
all matters involving his patent. His civil action will arise under the
patent law only where he alleges a cause of action which Congress has
created or where the allegations in his complaint indicate that a con-
struction of the patent laws will be involved in the litigation.44 A suit
" 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1964). This provision stems from Hum v. Oursler,
289 U.S. 238 (1933). 1 3. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.60, at 658 (2d ed. 1964).
" The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913).
" Id.; Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1834)
(dictum). 1 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTiCE 0.60, at 634 (2d ed. 1964).
"American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
"E. Edelman & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., 88 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1937).
The Supreme Court has passed on the merits of actions for declaratory judgment
involving invalidity or non-infringement without question as to jurisdiction.
Jungerson v. Ostby & Barton Co., 325 U.S. 560 (1949); Edward Katzinger Co. v.
Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394 (1947). See also Jewell Ridge Coal Corp.
v. Local 6167, UMW, 325 U.S. 161 (1945) (employer sought declaratory judg-
ment that he was not liable to employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act.).
"Wilson v. Sandford, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 99 (1850). See De Sylva v. Ballen-
1970]
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for recovery of royalties under a contract, license, or assignment; for
damages for breach of covenants; for specific performance; or for for-
feiture of a license is not a suit arising under the patent laws.45 Pursuant
to article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution, Congress, no doubt,
could create a federal cause of action on contracts involving patents,
but it has not done so. 6 Likewise, Congress could provide for federal
jurisdiction to enforce such contracts as it has done in section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act 7 for collective bargaining agree-
ments, but it has not done so. Consequently, in the absence of diversity,
a patentee must bring his common law contract actions involving his
patent in the state courts.
In Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co.,48 patentee instituted suit
in a state court in assumpsit to recover an agreed sum which defendant
had promised to pay for the use of the patent. Defendant had ceased
using plaintiff's patent because he had been informed that the plaintiff's
patent was an infringement of a prior patent issued to a third person.
The Court held that it was permissible for defendant to introduce evi-
dence in the state court to show that the plaintiff's patent was an in-
fringement of a prior patent. The Court said:
The state court has jurisdiction both of the parties and the subject-
matter as set forth in the declaration, and it could not be ousted of
such jurisdiction by the fact that, incidentally to one of these defences,
the defendant claimed the invalidity of a certain patent. To hold that
tine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956) (Copyright Act). If it should appear that the plain-
tiff was not relying upon the patent law for his alleged rights or if the claim of
right were frivolous, the case might be dismissed. The Fair v. Kohler Die &
Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913) (dictum).
"Wilson v. Sandford, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 99 (1850). Other examples include
the following: Injury to business involving slander of a patent is not a suit arising
under the patent laws. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S.
257 (1916) ; "The complaint that the assessment of these taxes was illegal because
in effect levied on patents or patent rights, did not involve the construction, or the
validity, or the infringement of the patents referred to, or any other question under
the patent laws. This was not, therefore, a suit 'arising under the patent laws' and
the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction on that ground." Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co.,
176 U.S. 68, 71 (1900).
" Now the dispute in this case does not arise under any act of Congress; nor
does the decision depend upon the construction of any law in relation to
patents. It arises out of the contract stated in the bill; and there is no act of
Congress providing for regulating contracts of this kind. The rights of the
parties depend altogether upon common law and equity principles.
Wilson v. Sandford, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 99, 101-02 (1850).
"29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
- 168 U.S. 255 (1897). Noted, 31 COLUm. L. REv. 461 (1931).
[Vol. 49
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it has no right to introduce evidence upon this subject is to do it a
wrong and deny it a remedy. Section 711 does not deprive the state
courts of the power to determine questions arising under the patent
laws, but only of assuming jurisdiction of cases arising under those
laws. There is a clear distinction between a case and a question arising
under the patent laws. The former arises when the plaintiff in his
opening pleading-be it a bill, complaint or declaration-sets up a
right under the patent laws as ground for a recovery. Of such the
state courts have no jurisdiction. The latter may appear in the plea or
answer or in the testimony. The determination of such question is
not beyond the competency of the state tribunals. 49
In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins5" the Court overruled its own doctrine which
estopped a patent licensee from questioning the validity of a patent
when he was being sued for royalties. As a result of this decision, the
number of patent "questions" decided in state courts may increase.
In 1894 the Court construed the general removal statute, as
amended in 1887-1888, to preclude removal from state to federal court
when federal questions were first raised by the defendant. Further, if a
plaintiff-patentee should allege a civil action arising under the patent
laws in his complaint filed in the state court, a defendant cannot remove.
The federal court will dismiss the removed action because the derivative
jurisdiction5 2 doctrine dictates that a federal court cannot acquire juris-
diction from a state court on removal unless the state *court had juris-
diction: Since civil actions arising under the patent laws are exclusive
to the federal courts, the state courts have no jurisdiction. Application
of the derivative jurisdiction doctrine in this situation has no redeem-
ing feature, and the Court should follow its own example in Lear, Inc. v.
AdkiS 53 and discard it."
" 168 U.S. at 259.
395 U.S. 653 (1969). Noted, 48 N.C.L. REv. 391 (1970).
t Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894),. Discussed pp. 32-
33 infra.
" General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. S.R.R., 260 U.S. 261 (1922) (anti-
trust laws). In American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257
(1916), the trial court applied the derivative doctrine and dismissed the case.
The Supreme Court reversed because the case did not arise under the patent laws
and should have been remanded to the state court.
- 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
"The American Law Institute proposes to -abolish the derivative jurisdiction
doctrine in those instances in which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.
AL, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
CouxTs § 1312(d), at 27 (1969).
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III. SPECIAL FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION-
FEDERAL CHARTERS
A unique member of the federal question family is the federal charter
jurisdiction. Cases arising under federal charters (acts of Congress
creating a corporation) illustrate the high water mark reached by the
Court in finding federal question jurisdiction. As will subsequently be
pointed out, Congress first acquiesced; then endorsed; and, finally, cur-
tailed this jurisdiction. After Congress curtailed federal charter juris-
diction, the Court observed that it had been "less exacting" 15 in the
charter cases than it had been in other areas. However, the jurisdictional
theory developed by the Court for these cases has never been overruled
either by the Court or Congress.
When Congress chartered the first national bank, it authorized this
bank "to sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, answer and be
answered, defend and be defended, in courts of record, or any other place
whatsoever." In the Bank of the United States v. Deveaux," the Court
held that Congress did not intend this language to confer jurisdiction on
the federal courts; rather, it established the capacity of the bank to sue
or be sued. The Court referred to the fact that Congress in the patent
law had provided expressly that a patentee could sue in the "Circuit
Court" of the United States.
In 1816 a bill was introduced in Congress to establish a second na-
tional bank. This bill proposed that the new bank could "sue and be
sued, plead and be impleaded, answer and be answered, defend or be
defended, in all courts and places whatsoever. '57 This provision was
changed by Congress to read in "all state courts having competent
jurisdiction, and in any circuit court of the United States."8  In the
famous case of Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 the initial question
before the Court was whether the language in the act of incorporation
of this bank conferred jurisdiction on the circuit courts. Chief Justice
Marshall noted the difference in the language used by Congress in the
act of incorporation before the Court and that used in the act incorpo-
rating the predecessor bank which the Court had construed in Bank of
the United States v. Deveau, 6 ° and he concluded that Congress by
• Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 113 (1936).9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
5r29 ANNAL.S OF COxG. 499 (1816).
Act of April 10, 1816, ch. 44, § 7, 3 Stat. 269 (emphasis added).
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
009 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
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specifically designating the Circuit Courts intended to confer jurisdiction
on them. The second question was whether Congress had the authority
under article III of the Constitution to do what the Court said Congress
intended to do. This question was answered in the affirmative. Thus
the Court decided two federal questions. Clearly, then, the Osborn case
was one "arising" under the laws and Constitution of the United States.
But the case is famous because Chief Justice Marshall went on to
develop a theory that would open the doors for federal corporations to
bring suits in the federal courts to litigate any judicial question. He
reasoned that the charter of a federal corporation, a law of the United
States, forms an "ingredient" 61 in every case brought by or against a
federal corporation. Thus every case brought by a federal corporation
is a case "arising" under the law creating it, and, regardless of the
nature of the litigation, there is original jurisdiction in the federal
courts to decide it. In a companion case, The Bank of the United States
v. Planter's Bank of Georgia,62 this "ingredient" theory was applied to
permit the Bank of the United States to sue a state bank in the federal
court on a promissory note.
In 1863 Congress provided for the establishment of national banking
associations, and section 59 of the resulting Act stated:
That suits, actions, and proceedings by and against any association
under this act may be had in any circuit, district, or territorial court
" Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 824-25 (1824):
But the question respecting the right to make a particular contract or to
acquire a particular property, or to sue on account of a particular injury,
belongs to every particular case, and may be renewed in every case. The
question forms an original ingredient in every cause. Whether it be in fact
relied on or not, in the defence, it is still a part of the cause, and may be relied
on. The right of the plaintiff to sue, cannot depend on the defence which the
defendant may choose to set up. His right to sue is anterior to that defence,
and must depend on the state of things when the action is brought. The
question which the case involves, then, must determine its character, whether
those questions be made in the cause or not.
The appellants say, that the case arises on the contract; but the validity
of the contract depends on a law of the United States, and the plaintiff is
compelled, in every case, to show its validity. The case arises emphatically
under the law. The act of Congress is its foundation. The contract could
never have been made, but under the authority of that act. The act itself is
the first ingredient in the case, is its origin, is that from which every other
part arises. That other questions may also arise, as the execution of the
contract, or its performance, cannot change the case, or give it any other
origin than the charter of incorporation. The action still originates in, and
is sustained by, that charter.
02 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
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of the United States held within the district in which such association
may be established.6
Congress did not repudiate Chief Justice Marshall's "ingredient" test
for federal corporations. Rather, by the foregoing legislation, it spe-
cifically endorsed it for national banking associations. Subsequently,
however, dissatisfaction arose over this broad grant of jurisdiction
as to national banks. Citizens complained about having to travel long
distances to attend federal courts and about the heavy bills of costs in
those courts. 4 Further, there was great concern in Congress over the
fact that the federal courts all over the country were overrun with
business, and as one Senator put it: "the small tide of litigation that
formerly flowed in Federal channels has swollen into a mighty stream."0 5
Act of February 25, 1863, ch. 58, § 59, 12 Stat. 681.
13 CONG. REC. 4083 (1882).
66 Id. at 4084 (1882). Senator Stockslager stated:
Mr. Speaker, there is another reason why some such amendment should
be adopted. The Federal courts all over the country are overrun with busi-
ness. The Supreme Court of the United States is far behind with its work,
and gentlemen are earnestly engaged in trying to devise some scheme to
relieve these courts. The Senate a few days ago passed a bill which provides
for intermediate appellate courts in each judicial circuit in the United States,
and provides for the appointment of eighteen new judges. I am unalterably
opposed to all such schemes for relief. The proper way to relieve these
courts is to reduce their jurisdiction.
In the last twenty years the jurisdiction of the Federal courts has been
greatly enlarged, so much so that an eminent judge of one of the United
States courts has lately declared that "the small tide of litigation that formerly
flowed in Federal channels has swollen into a mighty stream," and "that
much, perhaps most of the great litigations of the country are now con-
ducted by United States courts."
This has grown very largely out of the various Congressional enactments
incident to the late war, but to some extent out of the desire of the Re-
publican party to concentrate power and patronage in the Federal Govern-
ment. I think the masses of the people of all parties and in all sections of
the country are anxious to get back to the old order of things which existed
before the war, when they could try all of their causes except the very
few which constituted "the small tide of litigation" above referred to in
their own courts, near their homes, where they could be tried by a jury of
the hundred, in accordance with the ancient meaning of the trial by jury,
and not be taken hundreds of miles from their homes at ruinous expense
to be tried by a jury of strangers.
This amendment is a step in the right direction. Let us follow it up and
give to the State courts jurisdiction in many of the cases where it is now
so injuriously exercised by the Federal courts and there will be no need of
an increase of the number of Federal judges. The State courts are amply
able to transact all of the business which might very properly be transferred
to them; and certainly it would be much more satisfactory to the people,
[Vol. 49
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The result was legislation in 1882 taking from national banking associa-
tions the right to go into federal courts on the mere basis of incorporation
by Congress; henceforth, such banks were to be treated the same as state
banks."' In 1887 Congress provided that national banks were to be
deemed citizens of the states in which they were respectively located. 67
However, federal jurisdiction was provided without regard to diversity
in suits by the United States against any national banking association,
in any "civil action to wind up the affairs of any such association, and
[in] any action by a banking association established in the district for
which the court is held, under chapter 2 of Title 12, to enjoin the Comp-
troller of the Currency .... ,,68
In 1933 Congress provided that "all suits of a civil nature at common
law or in equity to which any corporation organized under the laws of
the United States shall be a party, arising out of transactions involving
international or foreign banking, . . . shall be deemed to arise under the
laws of the United States." 9 Further, Congress authorized the district
courts to exercise original and removal jurisdiction in these civil actions.
The legislation in 1882 which restricted jurisdiction over national
banks did not apply to Federal Reserve Banks. Jurisdiction based on
the "ingredient" theory continued for the Federal Reserve Banks until
it was swept away by the Act of 1925.70 However, Congress in -193371
restored this jurisdiction for the Federal Reserve Banks, and it con-
tinues in effect.
Other federal corporations have undergone an experience somewhat
similar to that of the national banks. In 1868 Congress provided that fed-
eral corporations, other than national banking associations, could remove
who at last must support this expensive system, which they deem in many
cases not only unnecessary but absolutely oppressive.
The reason for the jurisdiction, if any ever existed, has now happily
passed away; and I believe every true patriot will be glad to see a return
to the old order of things. I hope this amendment or that of my friend from
Georgia [Mr. HAMMOND] will be adopted and that we will supplement it
with other similar acts until the United States courts and the Supreme Court
of the United States will both be relieved from "the mighty stream of litiga-
tion" which is now pouring into them.
"Act of July 12, 1882, ch. 290, § 4, 22 Stat. 163.
Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 3,73, § 4, 24 Stat. 554. Congress by enacting this
statute endorsed the corporate fiction doctrine developed by the Court in Marshall
v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853).
08 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (1964).
00 12 U.S.C. § 632 (1964).
7o 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1964).7128 U.S.C. § 1348 (1964).
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cases from the state courts to the federal courts on the basis of a defense
arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States.72 In 1885
in the Pacific Removal Cases73 the Court interpreted the removal pro-
visions of the Act of 1875 broadly by applying the "ingredient" theory
to permit railroads chartered by Congress to remove ordinary tort
actions. Thirty years later Congress took away the federal charter
jurisdiction of railroads.74 Finally, in 1925 Congress provided:
The district courts shall not have jurisdiction of any civil action by or
against any corporation upon the ground that it was incorporated by or
under an Act of Congress, unless the United States is the owner of
more than one-half of its capital stock.75
Today the "ingredient" theory is applied to federal reserve banks, to federal
corporations when the civil action arises out of transactions involving
international or foreign banking, to corporations in which the United
States owns more than one half the stock, 6 and in very limited situations
involving national banking associations.
Justice Cardozo observed that the "doctrine of the charter cases was
to be treated as exceptional, though within their special field there was no
thought to disturb them."17 7 The exceptional feature of the federal charter
cases was that simply by virtue of the act of incorporation these corpo-
rations could sue on any common law cause of action they might have
on the theory that a federal question was presented when the act of
" Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 255, § 2, 15 Stat. 227.
" 115 U.S. 1 (1885). The Court set forth the rationale of the opinion as follows:
We are of opinion that corporations of the United States, created by and
organized under acts of Congress like the plaintiffs in error in these cases,
are entitled as such to remove into the Circuit Courts of the United States
suits brought against them in the State courts, under and by virtue of the
act of March 3, 1875, on the ground that such suits are suits "arising under
the laws of the United States." We do not propose to go into a lengthy argu-
ment on the subject; we think that the question has been substantially decided
long ago by this court. The exhaustive argument of Chief justice Marshall
in the case of Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 817-28,
delivered more than sixty years ago, and always acquiesced in, renders any
further discussion unnecessary to show that a suit by or against a corporation
of the United States is a suit arising under the laws of the United States.
Id. at 11. Mr. Justice Frankfurter referred to this case as an "unfortunate decision."
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 n.51 (1959).
Yet, Congress let it stand for thirty years.
"' Act of January 28, 1915, ch. 22, § 5, 38 Stat. 804.
' 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1964).
7' Federal Intermediate Credit Bank v. Mitchell, 277 U.S. 213 (1928) (United
States owned all the stock).
"' Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 114 (1936).
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incorporation was pleaded. This "ingredient" theory has not been extended
by the Court to special acts creating a federal cause of action. As previous-
ly indicated, a patentee cannot sue in the federal courts to enforce a con-
tract of assignment on the basis of a federal question. The patent law
does not so provide. On the other hand, under the "ingredient" theory
Congress has the power under the Constitution to create a federal cause
of action on contracts of assignment. As long as a patentee in good faith
alleges a cause of action within the scope of the patent law, federal juris-
diction attaches and remains even though only facts are litigated. In this
respect, the patent law is similar to the federal charter cases. And, likewise,
in both the patent and charter cases it is rare that the Court will be called
upon actually to interpret the words of the statute. On the other hand,
federal questions in a state court subject to review by the Supreme Court
of the United States always must involve the construction of the Constitu-
tion, a law, or a treaty of the United States.
IV. SPECIAL FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION-REiOVAL
BY FEDERAL OFFICERS
Congress has not passed a general statute making federal officers liable
for acts committed "under color," but in violation, of their federal au-
thority.7s However, as early as 1815,' 9 Congress provided that federal
customs officials could remove from the state courts civil or criminal suits
filed agaiist them for acts resulting from the enforcement of the customs
laws. This attempt to protect customs officers from interference by
hostile state courts was repeated in later enactments and then extended to
revenue officers." Finally, in 1948 a statute was enacted to cover all
federal officers:
8 Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963). (The Court held that it
would not fill the "hiatus" Congress has left in this area.) Congress made state
officers liable in 1871. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). This statute is discussed in the
next section pp. 20-23 infra.
Act of February 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 198.
SO Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405-06 (1969) briefly outlines the
history of these statutes:
The federal officer removal statute has had a long history. See l.M.
Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1147-1150
(1953). The first such removal provision was included in an 1815 customs
statute. Act of February 4, 1815, § 8, 3 Stat. 198. It was part of an attempt
to enforce an embargo on trade with England over the opposition of the
New England States, where the War of 1812 was quite unpopular. It allowed
federal officials involved in the enforcement of the customs statute to remove
to the federal courts any suit or prosecution commenced because of any act
done "under colour" of the statute. Obviously, the removal provision was
1970]
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(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State
court against any of the following persons may be removed by them to
the district court of the United States for the district and division
embracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) Any officer of the United States or any agency thereof, or
person acting under him, for any act under color of such office or
on account of any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of
Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the
collection of the revenue.
(2) A property holder whose title is derived from any such
officer, where such action or prosecution affects the validity of any
law of the United States.
(3) Any officer of the Courts of the United States, for any act
under color of office or in the performance of his duties.
(4) Any officer of either House of Congress, for any act in the
discharge of his official duty under an order of such House.81
Under article 1, section 8, clause 18, of the Constitution, Congress is autho-
rized "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing powers. . . ." The constitutional validity of
federal-officer-removal statutes rests on the right and power of the United
States to secure "the efficient execution of its laws and to prevent inter-
ference therewith, due to possible local prejudice ... ."82 Even if state law
governs the action, it is, nevertheless, a federal question because "the
interpretation of a federal defense makes the case 'arising under' the
Constitution or laws of the United States. '8 3 The procedure for removal
an attempt to protect federal officers from interference by hostile state
courts. This provision was not, however, permanent; it was by its terms
to expire at the end of the war. But other periods of national stress spawned
similar enactments. South Carolina's threats of nullification in 1833 led to
the passage of the so-called Force Bill, which allowed removal of all suits or
prosecutions for acts done under the customs laws. Act of March 2, 1833,
§ 3, 4 Stat. 633. A new group of removal statutes came with the Civil War,
and they were eventually codified into a permanent statute which applied
mainly to cases growing out of enforcement of the revenue laws. Rev. Stat.
§ 643 (1874) ; Judicial Code of 1911, § 33, 36 Stat. 1097. Finally, Congress
extended the statute to cover all federal officers when it passed the current
provision as part of the judicial Code of 1948.
"'28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1964). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1442a for removal by
members of the armed forces. For discussion of both sections, including procedure
for removal, see 1A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrIcE § 0.164[1]-[3] (2d ed. 1965).
8 Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 32 (1926); accord, Tennessee v. Davis, 100
U.S. 257 (1879). See also State v. Hoskins, 77 N.C. 530 (1877) (ruling favorably
on a removal petition by a federal revenue officer).8 Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963).
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for federal officers is governed by the general removal statute.8 4 The
federal officer is not permitted merely to conclude in his petition for removal
that he was acting under color of office; instead, he must show
[A] causal connection between what the officer has done under asserted
official authority and the state prosecution. It must appear that the
prosecution of him, for whatever offense, has arisen out of the acts
done by him under color of federal authority and in enforcement of
federal law, and he must by direct averment exclude the possibility that
it was based on acts or conduct of his not justified by his federal duty.
But the statute does not require that the prosecution must be for the
very acts which the officer admits to have been done by him under
federal authority. It is enough that his acts or his presence at the
place in performance of his official duty constitute the basis, though
mistaken or false, of the state prosecution. 5
The Court in Willingham v. Morgan recently rejected a narrow inter-
pretation given the 1948 statute by a lower court and held" that the test
for removal should be broader, not narrower, than the test for official
immunity. The Court said:
The federal officer removal statute is not "narrow" or "limited."
... At the very least, it is broad enough to cover all cases where federal
officers can raise a colorable defense arising out of their duty to enforce
federal law. One of the primary purposes of the removal statute-as its
history dearly demonstrates-was to have such defenses litigated in
the federal courts. The position of the court below would have the
anomalous result of allowing removal only when the officers had a
dearly sustainable defense. The suit would be removed only to be
dismissed. Congress certainly meant more than this when it chose the
words "under color of... office." In fact, one of the most important
reasons for removal is to have the validity of the defense of official
immunity tried in a federal court. The officer need not win his case
before he can have it removed. In cases like this one, Congress has
decided that federal officers, and indeed the Federal Government itself,
require the protection of a federal forum. This policy should not be
frustrated by narrow, grudging interpretation of § 1442(a) (1).87
Congress has thus provided a haven in the federal courts for federal
officers being sued or prosecuted in the state courts. By comparison and as
8,28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1964).
Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 33 (1926).
8' 395 U.S. 402 (1969).
Id. at 406-07.
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previously indicated, the haven provided for federal corporations has been
taken away by Congress, for the most part, by a series of statutes during
the period 1882-1925.88 Clearly, Congress wished to reduce the flood of
cases involving federal corporations, and, no doubt, the necessity for a
haven so obvious at the time of the Osborn case 9 had dissipated somewhat
after the Civil War. As will be subsequently developed, Congress has
curtailed removal under the general removal statute;9O and, recently, in
City of Greenwood v. Peacock," the Court adhered to its narrow inter-
pretation of the Civil Rights Removal Statute." Today, federal officer
removal is a favored member of the federal question jurisdiction family.
V. SPECIAL FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION-CIvIL RIGHTS
ACT OF APRIL 20, 1871
During the period 1866-1875 five Civil Rights Acts were passed. 8
Section 1 of the Act of April 20, 1871" 4 is the "lineal ancestor" of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a statute of considerable vitality, which provides:
88 See text pp. 15-17 supra.
"22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
"See text pp. 34-36 infra.
91384 U.S. 808 (1966). See id. at 833-34 for the impact a broad interpretation
of this statute would have on federal courts and on federal-state court relations.
92 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1964).
"
9 Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335; Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17
Stat. 13; Act of February 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433; Act of May 3, 1870, ch.
114, 16 Stat. 140; Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
"' This act, "sometimes called 'the "third force bill,"' was passed by a Congress
that had the Klan 'particularly in mind.'" Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174
(1961).
CHAP. XXII.-An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
nent to the Constitution of the United States, and for other
Purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That any person who under color
of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State,
shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of
the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary not-
withstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prose-
cuted in the several district or circuit courts of the United States, with and
subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error, and other remedies
provided in like cases in such courts, under the provisions of the act of the
ninth of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-six entitled "An act to protect
all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the
means of their vindication"; and the other remedial laws of the United States
which are in their nature applicable in such cases.
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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,95 shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.
The jurisdictional companion of this statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the
United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States.
One reason the Act of 1871 (i.e. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343
(3)) has so much vitality today is that, like most special federal question
statutes, it does not require any jurisdictional amount; whereas the Act
of 1875 providing for general federal question jurisdiction (to be dis-
cussed in the following section) has always required a minimum juris-
dictional amount." Obviously many human rights, as distinguished from
property rights, are not readily evaluated in monetary terms. The
Court has further made the Act of 1871 more attractive than the Act of
1875 by substantially eliminating the requirement that administrative
remedies be exhausted before invoking the Act of 1871.1
7
The Act of 1871 applies only to state action and not to federal action.
The Court also has ruled that Congress did not intend for this section to
permit suits against municipalities."
Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat 13. Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1871:
Continuing Vitality, 40 NoTRa DAmE LAWYER 70 (1964).
"The words "and laws" in the current statute were added in 1874. REv. STAT.
§ 1979, at 348 (1875).
" Initially over $500 and currently in excess of $10,000 exclusive of interests
and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1964).
"' Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668 (1963); Comment, Exhaustion of State Remedies under the Civil
Rights Act, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1201 (1968).
"Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (City of Chicago). This does not
preclude suits against an official of a city acting under color of office. Hague v.
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In Holt v. Indiana0 plaintiff sought to enjoin a state tax assessment
on patent rights. He alleged jurisdiction on two grounds: a suit arising
under both the patent laws and the Act of 1871. The Court rejected both
grounds and stated:
If state legislation impairs the obligation of a contract, or deprives of
property without due process of law, or denies the equal protection of
the laws, as asserted by counsel in respect of the statutes of Indiana,
remedies are found in [the Act of 1875] .100
The Court went on to hold that the plaintiff's action arose under the Act
of 1875, but the case was dismissed because the requisite jurisdictional
amount 0l was not present. Subsequently, the Court has adhered only in
part to the exclusions set forth in Holt.102 The alleged denial of equal
protection in tax actions is still not considered a civil rights violation, and
hence jurisdiction is not proper under the Act of 1871 for these actions.' 03
Suits attacking state legislation impairing the obligation of contracts, 10
as well as these tax suits, are proper under the Act of 1875 if the juris-
dictional amount is involved. Otherwise, they must be litigated in the
state courts. On the other hand, litigants who prefer the federal courts
to the state courts can successfully employ the Act of 1871 and thus avoid
the jurisdictional amount requirement of the Act of 1875 in many cases-
including those involving reapportionment, 10 5 the right to attend integrated
schools,'05 and the right of residents of a federal enclave to vote' 07-- in-
volving alleged violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Act of 1871 is also available when state action is
CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Un-
constitutionai Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968). judge Friendly has said:
"Actions against a government official acting 'under color of' statutes and ordinances
are what 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Act of 1871] is mainly about." Eisen v. Eastman, 421
F.2d 560, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1969).
176 U.S. 68 (1900).
"'
0 Id. at 72. The Court cited the Act of August 13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433,
which was a subsequent re-enactment of the Act of 1875 and which is now codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 13,31(a) (1964).
0At that time the amount required was in excess of $2,000.
102 176 U.S. 68, 72 (1900).
" Alterman Transp. Lines v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 259 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.
Tenn. 1966), aff'd, 386 U.S. 262 (1967) (per curiam).
... See p. 38 infra.
... Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
"' McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
"' Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
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alleged to violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment1 8 or
the right to freedom of speech under the first amendment.0 9
Mr. Justice Stone in Hague v. CIO thought the Act of 1871 applied
"whenever the right or immunity is one of personal liberty, not dependent
for its existence upon the infringement of property rights."" 0 This test
generally"' has been adhered to, thus leaving cases that would otherwise
qualify under the Act of 1871 to meet the jurisdictional-amount test of
the Act of 1875. If the test is not met, such cases must be litigated in
the state courts with possible appellate review by the United States Su-
preme Court. Notwithstanding the restrictive interpretation given the
Act of 1871 by distinguishing personal and property rights, the statute
serves to provide a federal forum for important cases which could not
qualify under the jurisdictional requirements of the Act of 1875 or any
other federal statute.
VI. GENERAL FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION-
THE ACT OF 1875
The Act of February 13, 1801112 was a short-lived predecessor of the
108 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
'
0 0Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
110 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
Judge Friendly in Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 564 (2d Cir. 1969) states:
So far as our research has disclosed, Mr. Justice Stone's definition would
encompass all the cases in which the Supreme Court has sustained jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), with the possible exception of King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968), where the applicability
of the Civil Rights Act was neither challenged nor discussed. Moreover, it
is quite arguable that King came within Justice Stone's formulation on the
basis that Alabama's "substitute father" regulation not merely caused eco-
nomic loss to Mrs. Smith's children, but also infringed their "liberty" to
grow up with financial aid for their subsistence and her "liberty" to have
Mr. Williams visit her on weekends.
See Laufer, Hague v. CIO: Mr. Justice Stone's Test of Federal Jurisdiction-A
Reappraisal, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 547 (1970).
1' Act of February 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89. It provided jurisdiction in the
circuit courts "of all cases in law or equity, arising under the constitution and laws
of the United States, and treaties made, under their authority; ... and also of
all actions, or suits, matters or things cognizable by the judicial authority of the
United States, under and by virtue of the constitution thereof, where the matter
in dispute shall amount to four hundred dollars .... " As to the jurisdictional
amount provision:
Mr. NIcHOLAS moved to fill the blank with 500, so as to confine the
jurisdiction to debts above $500. Among other reasons assigned by him,
he stated that the estate of Lord Fairfax, with the quit rents due thereon,
had been confiscated during the Revolution by the State of Virginia; not-
withstanding the confiscation, the heirs of Lord Fairfax had sold all their
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Act of 1875. It was repealed in 1802.113 Congress in the Act of 1875
provided for original jurisdiction in the circuit courts, concurrent with
state courts, and for removal thereto from the state courts:
[O]f all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the
matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five
hundred dollars, and arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
authority... 114
The similarity of the language of the Act of 1875 (as well as 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (a) which is the current115 version of that Act) to that of the first
clause in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution 6 is apparent. In 1824,
in Osborn v. Bank of the United States"17 Chief Justice Marshall had
construed broadly the test for cases "arising" under the Constitution:
We think, then, that when a question to which the judicial power of
the Union is extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the
original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts
rights, (which the assignees contended remained unimpaired.) It might be
their wish to prosecute in a Federal court, expecting to gain advantages in
it which could not be had from the courts of Virginia. His object was to
defeat the purpose by limiting the jurisdiction of the circuit courts to sums
beyond the amount of quit rents, alleged to be due by any individual.
[It is understood that the present assignees of the claims of Lord Fairfax,
are General Marshall, General Lee, and a third individual, and that they
maintain their claims under the British Treaty.]
The motion was opposed by Messrs. HARPER and BAYARD.
On the question being taken, it was lost by the casting vote of the
Chairman-ayes 37, noes 37. The blank was then filled with $400-ayes 41.
10 ANNALS OF CONG. 897 (1801).
... Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132. F. FRANxrFuTER & J. LANDIS,
THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 24-29 (1927), discusses the Act of 1801 and
its repeal in 1802.
... Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
"r28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1964). "The district courts shall have original juris-
diction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000 exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States." Id. The jurisdictional amount was in-
creased from $500 plus to $2,000 plus in 1887, to $3,000 plus in 1911, and to $10,000
plus in 1958. The circuit courts were abolished in 1912, and jurisdiction under the
Act of 1875 was transferred to the district courts. The present removal provisions
are contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
"' "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority .... ." U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
1722 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law
may be involved in it." 8
Did Congress intend the word "arising" in the Act of 1875 to be as
broad as the "ingredient" test promulgated by the Court in 1824 for
"arising" in the constitutional provision? Senator Carpenter, on behalf
of the Judiciary Committee, presented a bill on June 15, 1874, which,
approximately nine months later, was to become the Act of 1875. In the
middle of a long debate on the floor of the Senate on section 11 of the bill
(which was concerned with service of process on agents), Senator Car-
penter said:
The act of 1789 did not confer the whole power which the Constitution
conferred; it did not do what the Supreme Court has said Congress
ought to do; it did not perform what the Supreme Court has declared
to be the duty of Congress. This bill does." 9
This language taken out of context 2 ° and without regard to other factors
18 d. at 823.
1192 CONG. REC. 4986 (1874).
... The context surrounding Senator Carpenter's statement was as follows:
Mr. BAYARD. The wisdom of the law of 1789 and the wisdom of the
Senator from Wisconsin who now proposes to amend it. That is the differ-
ence between the two. The law of 1789 requires one of the parties to be
a resident in the district where the suit is brought, and the Senator from
Wisconsin in his anxiety to increase the Federal jurisdiction proposes that
neither of the parties may be a resident of the district but that they shall be
citizens of the different States. That is all.
Mr. CARPENTER. That is all the Constitution requires.
Mr. BAYARD. The Constitution requires that; but I say the law of 1789
was built by wise men. It has been the law of this country until to-day. The
action under it has been satisfactory by requiring one of the parties to be a
resident of the district where the suit is brought. It was a wise restriction.
It has been tested by the experience of time. And what cause is there for
uprooting this and other venerable landmarks of the past? I do put the
wisdom of the Senate of 1789 against the wisdom of the Senator of Wisconsin
of today, and it is no disparagement to him to say that this law having stood
the test of time should not be lightly changed.
You are now allowing a man to sue his defendant in a district where the
defendant does not reside, and in a district where he himself does not reside.
He follows him until he finds both of them in a strange country; and there,
where neither is known, where less opportunity for a just trial exists than
the law of 1789 required, the suit may be commenced and may be commenced
in this excessively unreal, highly constructive method of summoning him not
personally but by some man who is called his agent. Even the word "autho-
rized" is not inserted before "agent." The agency is of the most shadowy
character. He may be his agent by the merest conversation. He may be
alleged to be his agent only, and then proved to be his agent perhaps by the
man himself if the agent can prove his authority; and that is to deprive a man
19701
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
lends support to the notion that Congress intended to confer on the circuit
courts all the jurisdiction over federal questions permitted by the Con-
stitution. But further inquiry indicates that such a conclusion is not
altogether justified. In the first place, an express provision of the Act of
1875 specifically excludes from the Act's purview cases in which the
of his property to the extent of his entire fortune, or it may be of that which
is more value to him in the shape of his character.
Mr. CARPENTER. The Senator from Delaware says that he puts the act
of 1789 against the wisdom of the Senator from Wisconsin. Well, it is
pretty hard on me to put the wisdom of a statute against mine; but I pro-
pose to state the issue a little differently. I put the wisdom of the Constitution
of the United States against the wisdom of the Senator from Delaware.
Mr. BAYmAX. Is the act of 1789 in contravention of the Constitution?
Mr. CARPENTER. I think it is substantially in contravention of the Con-
stitution, and I will state why. The Constitution says that certain judicial
powers shall be conferred upon the United States. The Supreme Court of the
United States in an opinion delivered by Judge Story-I do not recollect now
in what celebrated case it was, whether Cohens vs. Virginia or some of
those famous cases-said that it is the duty of the Congress of the United
States to vest all the judicial power of the Union in some Federal court, and
if they may withhold a part of it they may withhold all of it and defeat the
Constitution by refusing or simply omitting to carry its provisions into execu-
tion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the judicial power of
the United States shall extend to all controversies between citizens of differ-
ent States. A controversy between the Senator and myself is a controversy
between citizens of different States. If we both happen to meet in New
York, it is a controversy between citizens of different States, and by the
Constitution I may sue him in the Federal court in New York, because the
controversy between us is between citizens of different States. The act
of 1789 did not confer the whole power which the Constitution conferred;
it did not do what the Supreme Court has said Congress ought to do; it
did not perform what the Supreme Court has declared to be the duty of
Congress. This bill does. This bill confers that right, and why have we
done sof The act of 1789 was undoubtedly a wise act for that time; but the
thirteen States which then constituted the Union have grown now to thirty-
seven; our commerce that was streaming up and down the Atlantic coast
crosses the continent; our people have become totally changed in their
methods of doing business; we are a roving, traveling people; the New
Yorker is as much at home in California as he used to be in Massachusetts;
he does not feel farther away from his fireside when he sits down by the
billows of the Pacific than he used to when he was at Cape Cod, and in
fact he is not, because he can return as quickly. The whole circumstances
of the people, the necessities of business, our situation, have totally and
entirely changed.
As the law now stands-I speak of the law Federal and State-if there is
a difficulty between the Senator from Delaware and myself, and we both
meet in New York, he can sue me there in the State court. What does this
bill do? It authorizes him to sue me there in the Federal court. Is that
hardship?
2 CONG. REc. 4986-87 (1874) (emphasis added).
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jurisdictional amount is not in excess of five hundred dollars exclusive of
costs. Moreover, the Supreme Court has not held that all constitutionally
permissible judicial power ought to be vested in lower federal courts. In
Turner v. Bank of America"1 the Court said:
[T]he political truth is, that the disposal of the judicial power (ex-
cept in a few specified instances) belongs to Congress; and Congress is
not bound to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal courts to every
subject, in every form which the Constitution might warrant. 122
In 1816, in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,123 Justice Story in dealing with
the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court to review
federal questions decided in a state court stated:
It would seem, therefore, to follow, that Congress are bound to create
some inferior courts, in which to vest all that jurisdiction which, under
the constitution, is exclusively vested in the United States, and of which
the supreme court cannot take original cognizance. They might establish
one or more inferior courts; they might parcel out the jurisdiction
among such courts, from time to time, at their own pleasure. But the
whole judicial power of the United States should be, at all times,
vested either in an original or appellate form, in some courts created
under its authority.124
Further, as Professor Mishkin 25 has observed, the words "arising under"
should be broader in the Constitution than in the Act of 1875 because,
as used in the Constitution, they include appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court over state courts. Then, too, the Court has from time
to time stated that the same words not only may have different meaning.
in the same act but also may be used in a statute in a different sense from
that in which they were used in the Constitution.U And, finally, the "in-
I21 1 U.S. (I Dall.) 8 (1799).
122 Id. at 10.
14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304 (1816).
. Id. at 331 (emphasis added). Senator Carpenter was referring, no doubt, to
this case rather than to Cohens v. Virginia.
2
' Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 CoLum. L. REv.
157, 162-63 (1953).
"" Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918) ; Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60
(1916). 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.60[2], at 606 (2d ed. 1964) states:
Hence parallel language in the Constitution and in a jurisdictional statute
does not in and by itself demand an identical interpretation. Thus Marshall
was surely right in holding that Congress could constitutionally give the
circuit court jurisdiction of actions brought by or against a federally char-
tered bank; that these were suits 'arising under' the Constitution and laws
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gredient" test of the Osborn case'27 was not mentioned in the debates,
and certainly there is no indication that Congress was aware of the
enormous consequences12 which would flow from incorporating such a
test in the Act of 1875. In any event, the judicial history of the Act of
1875 (both original and removal provisions) reveals that with one excep-
tion.29 the Court has not adopted the "ingredient" test in interpreting it.
The tests for its application are narrower than the "ingredient" test.
Even under the narrow tests adopted, the increase in the number of cases
in the federal courts was too much to suit Congress. As early as 1887
Congress enacted legislation restricting the scope of the Act of 1875.
Further limitations have since been imposed.
A working knowledge of the Act of 1875 involves, first, the manner
in which the Court has interpreted it 13 0 and, second, the limitations im-
posed on it by Congress. At the time the Act of 1875 became law,
thousands of landowners held title from the United States by act of Con-
gress or their title could be traced directly to a federal land patent. Cases
involving these land patents provided the setting for the Court to interpret
the Act of 1875.
A. Land Cases: Rejection of the "'Ingredient" Test
Prior to considering the first land patent case under the Act of 1875,
the Court in reviewing state court decisions held"3 1 that a federal question
was not involved in a land dispute simply because one or both parties
derived title to the land directly or indirectly from an Act of Congress.
The Court indicated that an actual construction of the Act of Congress
would be necessary in the decision of the case in order to invoke its
appellate review.
In 1877 in Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes,'82 the Court had an
opportunity to deal with the term "arising" as used in the Act of 1875 in
of the United States, within the intendment of Article III. But in applying
the Statutory grant, § 1331, which uses similar language, courts do not give
the statute such a latitudinarian construction.
1'722 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
12' For instance, suits on patent contracts would meet the "ingredient" test and
thus "arise" under the Act of 1875 without further legislation by Congress.
12. The Pacific Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885). See pp. 28-31 infra for a dis-
cussion of these cases.
3
' Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 992 (1950); Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 390 (1950); Annot.,
12 A.L.R.2d 5 (1950).
... McStay v. Friedman, 92 U.S. 723 (1875); Romie v. Casanova, 91 U.S. 379
(1875).
12296 U.S. 199 (1871).
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a case removed from the state court to a federal court. The plaintiff sought
to restrain the defendant from polluting Bear River by depositing "tail-
ings" in it in the course of its mining operations. Defendant in its
petition for removal set forth its ownership of title derived under the
laws of the United States. Further, it was alleged that the action would
involve the construction of certain laws of the United States (specifically
set forth in the petition for removal) dealing with the development of
mining resources of the United States. In upholding a remand order the
Court did not discuss the "ingredient" test, but its decision, in effect,
rejected it. The Court defined the test for removal of these land patent
cases in the following language:
A cause cannot be removed from a State court simply because, in
the progress of the litigation, it may become necessary to give a con-
struction to the Constitution or laws of the United States. The decision
of the case must depend upon that construction. The suit must, in part
at least, arise out of a controversy between the parties in regard to the
operation and effect of the Constitution or laws upon the facts involved.
That this was the intention of Congress is apparent from sect. 5 of the
act of 1875, which requires the Circuit Court to dismiss the cause, or
remand it to the State court, if it shall appear, "at any time after such
suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does not really
or substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the
jurisdiction of said Circuit Court."
Before, therefore, a circuit court can be required to retain a cause
under this jurisdiction, it must in some form appear upon the record,
by a statement of facts, "in legal and logical form," such as is required
in good pleading (1 Chit. Pl. 213), that the suit is one which "really
and substantially involves a dispute or controversy" as to a right which
depends upon the construction or effect of the Constitution, or some
law or treaty of the United States. If these facts sufficiently appear
in the pleadings, the petition for removal need not restate them; but,
if they do not, the omission must be supplied in some form, either by
the petition or otherwise. Under the application of this rule, we think
that the record in this case is insufficient and that the Circuit Court
did not err in remanding the cause:x3
...Id. at 203-04. In Robinson v. Anderson, 121 U.S. 522 (1887), an original
suit involving a land patent, the Court applied section 5 of the Act of 1875 (referred
to in Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes) to dismiss the case for -want of juris-
diction because the pleadings indicated that it was not a case "arising." Section
5 later became 28 U.S.C. § 80, and in 1948 it became 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964), and
it now applies to "Parties collusively joined or made." The clause employed in
Robinson v. Anderson is now deleted.
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The narrow test adopted by the Court for removal of federal questions un-
der the Act of 1875 somewhat resembles the test for appellate review of
state court decisions. The fundamental difference is that under the Act
of 1875 a case may be removed if the pleadings show that the suit is one
which really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy as to a
right which depends upon the construction or effect of the Constitution,
some law, or treaty of the United States; whereas review by the Court of a
state court decision concerning a federal question requires that the final
judgment must show that a federal question was actually decided and
the outcome of the case depended on it. As will be subsequently shown,
the test for removal was narrowed further when removal based on a
federal defense was eliminated."5 4
In Shosone Mining Co. v. Rutter"5  involving an original and a re-
moval case, the Court rejected 36 the "ingredient" test of the federal
... Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894). See pp. 32-33
infra.
r, 177 U.S. 505 (1900).
180 Id. at 509-10:
As against this we are met by these suggestions: First, that a corporation
created by Congress has a right to invoke the jurisdiction of the Federal
courts in respect to any litigation which it may have, except as specifically
restricted by some act of Congress. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9
Wheat. 738; Pacific Railroad Renwval Cases, 115 U.S. 1. The argument of
Chief Justice Marshall in support of this was, briefly, that a corporation has
no powers and can incur no obligations except as authorized or provided for
in its charter. Its power to do any act which it assumes to do, and its liability
to any obligation which is sought to be cast upon it, depend upon its charter,
and when such charter is given by one of the laws of the United States there
is the primary question of the extent and meaning of that law. In other
words, as to every act or obligation the first question is whether that act
or obligation is within the scope of the law of Congress, and that being the
matter which must be first determined a suit by or against the corporation
is one which involves a construction of the terms of its charter; in other
words, a question arising under the law of Congress. But that argument is
not pertinent here. The right of the contestants in an adverse suit, as we
have seen, does not always call for any construction of an act of Congress.
It may depend solely on local rules or customs or state statutes, and in that
case does not involve a dispute or controversy "which depends upon the
construction or effect of the Constitution, or some law or treaty of the United
States." "In most actions concerning mining claims, the parties agree as to
the proper rule of construction to be applied to the mining laws, and the
controversies are usually limited to questions of fact relating to the compliance
with these laws. In such cases the Federal courts have no original juris-
diction, unless there is a diversity of citizenship; but in cases arising under
section twenty-three hundred and twenty-six of the Revised Statutes, the
authority for the action is found in the legislation of Congress. Without this
authority the action for the purposes avowed by the statute could not be
maintained." 2 Lindley on Mines, sec. 748. A statute authorizing an action
to establish a right is very different from one which creates a right to be
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charter cases and adhered to the test set forth in Gold-Washing & Water
Co. v. Keyes.'17 Congress could, according to the Court, confer juris-
diction on the federal courts to litigate any controversy growing out of
the disposal of the public lands, but it had not done so. The Court put it
this way:
By the Constitution (art. 3, sec. 2) the judicial power of the United
States extends "to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this
Constitution, the laws of the United States" and to controversies "be-
tween citizens of different States." By article 4, s. 3, cl. 2, Congress is
given "power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United
States." Under these clauses Congress might doubtless provide that
any controversy of a judicial nature arising in or growing out of the
disposal of the public lands should be litigated only in the courts of the
United States. The question, therefore, is not one of the power of
Congress, but of its intent. It has so constructed the judicial system
of the United States that the great bulk of litigation respecting rights
of property, although those rights may in their inception go back to
some law of the United States, is in fact carried on in the courts of
the several States. 38
In 1912 the Court shed some light on the policy involved in adopting a
narrow construction of the Act of 1875 in the land cases:
A suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the
United States is not necessarily, or for that reason alone, one arising
under those laws, for a suit does not so arise unless it really and sub-
stantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity,
construction or effect of such a law, upon the determination of which
the result depends. This is especially so of a suit involving rights to
land acquired under a law of the United States. If it were not, every
suit to establish title to land in the central and western States would
so arise, as all titles in those States are traceable back to those laws.13 9
It is possible for a land patent case to qualify for federal jurisdiction
under the Act of 1875. In Kansas Pacific Railroad Co. v. Atchison Rail-
established. An action brought under the one may involve no controversy
as to the scope and effect of the statute, while in the other case it necessarily
involves such a controversy, for the thing to be decided is the extent of the
right given by the statute.
lf'96 U.S. 199 (1877). See also joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S. 332 (1906) (no
jurisdiction where land formed by accretion).
... Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 506 (1899).
... Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 (1912) (emphasis added).
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road,14 both parties claimed title to the same land in Kansas under differ-
ent acts of Congress, and the Court held that the case would involve the
construction of these acts of Congress. In Hopkins v. Walker,141 in plain-
tiff's action to remove a cloud on his title sufficient facts were alleged to
convince the court that it would be necessary for the district court to
construe the mining laws of the United States. In both cases the Court
held that jurisdiction under the Act of 1875 was proper.
B. Original Jurisdiction-No Anticipation of Defense Rule
In 1888, in Metcalf v. Watertown 42 the Court decided that a plain-
tiff could not invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts under the Act
of 1875 by anticipating a defense in the complaint. This rule, which is
still applicable, was stated in the following language:
Where, however, the original jurisdiction of a Circuit Court of the
United States is invoked upon the sole ground that the determination of
the suit depends upon some question of a Federal nature, it must
appear, at the outset, from the declaration or the bill of the party
suing, that the suit is of that character; in other words, it must appear,
in that class of cases, that the suit was one of which the Circuit Court,
at the time its jurisdiction is invoked, could properly take cognizance.
If it does not so appear, then the court, upon demurrer, or motion, or
upon its own inspection of the pleading, must dismiss the suit; just as
it would remand to the state court a suit which the record, at the time
of removal, failed to show was within the jurisdiction of the Circuit
Court. It cannot retain it in order to see whether the defendant may
not raise some question of a Federal nature upon which the right of
recovery will finally depend; and if so retained, the want of jurisdic-
tion, at the commencement of the suit, is not cured by an answer or
plea which may suggest a question of that kind.143
In Te nnessee v. Union & Planters' Bank'44 the State of Tennessee
sought to collect taxes allegedly due and in its complaint stated that the
140 112 U.S. 414 (1884).
141244 U.S. 486 (1917). Two recent cases in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
follow the tests employed in these early land patent cases. Simpson v. Utah, 365
F.2d 185 (10th Cir. 1966) (no jurisdiction); Midwestern Devs., Inc. v. City of
Tulsa, 333 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1964) (jurisdiction).
14 128 U.S. 586 (1888).
1
,
2 Id. at 589.
'" 152 U.S. 454 (1894). The Court relied on the following language to defeat
jurisdiction: "[T]he right of the plaintiff to sue cannot depend on the defense which
the defendant may choose to set up. His right to sue is anterior that defence, and
must depend on the state of things when the action is brought." Id. at 459. This
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defendant claimed that the taxes sought to be collected were in violation of
the Impairment of Contract clause of the Constitution. The Court held
that the lower federal court did not have jurisdiction under the Act of
1875 and ordered the case dismissed. Another illustration of the applica-
tion of the rule of Metcalf v. Watertown'45 appeared in the often cited
case of Louisuille & Nashille Railroad v. Mottley. 46 In that case plain-
tiffs sought specific performance of a contract with defendant railroad in
the federal court. Under the contract plaintiffs were entitled to a free
pass. Subsequent to the execution of the contract, Congress outlawed free
passes, and defendant, thereafter, refused to perform the contract. Plain-
tiffs alleged that defendants had ceased to perform the contract because
of the Act of Congress. They further alleged that the legislation did not
apply retroactively; and, if so, it violated the fifth amendment of the
Constitution in that it deprived the plaintiffs of their property without due
process of law. The Court raised the question of jurisdiction on its own
motion and dismissed the case on the ground that the plaintiff could not
invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts by anticipating the defense.
In Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,147 suit was begun under
the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act in federal district court. The
plaintiff sought a declaration that the contracts between it and the de-
fendant were in full force and effect. Plaintiff alleged jurisdiction under
the Act of 1875 on the ground that it would be necessary for the court to
construe a federal law inasmuch as the defendant's right to terminate the
contract was dependent upon whether a certificate of public convenience and
necessity had issued in accordance with provisions of the Natural Gas
Act. The Court held that this was not a case arising under a federal law
because plaintiff was suing on a common law contract. The Natural Gas
language was used in the Osborn case to create jurisdiction. The removal cases,
also involved in Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, are discussed in the next
section at pp. 24-36 infra.
', 128 U.S. 586 (1888).
, 211 U.S. 149 (1908) (Numerous cases applying the Metcalf rule are cited).
The plaintiffs started over in a state court and lost on the merits in the United
States Supreme Court. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911). The
ALI does not recommend changing the "Well-Pleaded Complaint" Rule to permit
invoking original federal jurisdiction by anticipating a defense that defendant will
raise, but it does recommend under section 1312 of the ALI proposals that either
the plaintiff or the defendant be able to remove a case such as Louisville & N. R.R.
v. Mottley because of the federal defense interposed in the state court proceeding.
ALI, STUDY OF THE DivislON OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
CoURTs 25, at 169 (1969).
"1 339 U.S. 667 (1950). Compare declaratory judgment in patent cases. See
p. 9 supra. See also Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 248 (1952).
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Act was a matter of defense. Plaintiff in a suit for specific performance
could not invoke federal jurisdiction by anticipating the defense, and
since the declaratory judgment was a procedural device only, it could not
be used to get around the rule which forbids the plaintiff to anticipate a
federal defense. To have held otherwise would have permitted the declara-
tory judgment to be used to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Thus the Court adhered to the rule of Metcalf v. Watertown' 4s and did
not permit the plaintiff to invoke federal jurisdiction by anticipating
a federal defense in the complaint.
C. Removal on the Basis of a Federal Defense
In 1880 in Railroad Company v. Mississippi,4 ' Mississippi sued in
its state court seeking the removal of defendant's bridge across Pearl River
located on the Mississippi-Louisiana boundary line and to require defendant
to erect a drawbridge of specified dimensions. Plaintiff alleged that the
stationary bridge was an obstruction to navigation and a public nuisance
and that its erection and maintenance was in violation of defendant's
charter. Defendant responded that it was authorized to erect the bridge in
question by an act of Congress and that under this act Congress reserved
authority to alter its authorization should this bridge become an obstruc-
tion to navigable waters. The Court held that it would be necessary
for the lower court to construe an act of Congress; therefore, defendant's
federal defense was a case "arising" under a federal law and removable
under the Act of 1875.
In 1894 in Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank50 the Court did
not adhere to its holding in Railroad Company v. Mississippi5' and thus
eliminated removal based on a federal defense. The Court relied on the
language of the Acts of 1887-1888152 to reach this result. Congress in
1887-1888 restricted the application of the Act of 1875 in several ways:
The jurisdictional amount was increased from over $500 to over $2,000;
plaintiffs could no longer remove; and removal jurisdiction was restricted
to those cases in which the federal courts would have "original" juris-
diction. The latter provision was interpreted by the Court to mean that
148 128 U.S. 586 (1888).
149 102 U.S. 135 (1880).
10 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
102 U.S. 135 (1880).
.Act of August 13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433; Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373,
24 Stat. 552. The former Act corrected certain minor errors appearing in the Act
of March 3, 1887.
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the defendant could remove only when the plaintiff's complaint alleged
a case "arising." The result was to eliminate removal based on a federal
defense.
The legislative history of the Acts of 1887-1888 supports the Court's
interpretation of the intent of Congress. The bill before Congress spe-
cifically provided:
Sec. 2 That any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, arising
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their authority, of which the circuit
courts of the United States are given original jurisdiction by the pre-
ceding section, which may now be pending, or which may hereafter be
brought, in any State court, may be removed by the defendant or
defendants therein to the circuit court of the United States for the
proper district whenever it is made to appear from the application
of such defendant or defendants that his or their defense depends
in whole or in part upon a correct construction of some provision of
the Constitution or law of the United States, or treaty made by their
authority .... 153
... 18 CONG. REc. 613 (1887) (emphasis added).
Mr. CULBERSON. Mr. Speaker, this bill has passed the House of Repre-
sentatives in the last three Congresses, in substantially the same form as
the present. I propose, however, to state briefly what will be the effect
of the amendments which the bill proposes to make in the existing law.
The object of the bill is to diminish the jurisdiction of the circuit courts
and the Supreme Court of the United States, to promote the convenience
of the people, and to lessen the burden and expense of litigation. The methods
employed by the bill are, first, to raise the minimum amount giving the cir-
cuit courts jurisdiction from $500 to $2,000. In the second place, we propose
to take away from the circuit courts of the United States all jurisdiction of
controversies between the assignees of promissory notes and the makers
thereof, unless suit could have been maintained in such courts had no
assignment been made. In the next place, the bill proposes to take away
wholly from the circuit courts the jurisdiction now exercised by them over
controversies in which one of the parties is a corporation organized under
the laws of one State and doing business in another State. We propose to
provide that the circuit courts shall have no jurisdiction over controversies
of that sort; that whenever a corporation organized under the laws of one
State shall carry on its business in another State, the corporation shall,
for judicial purposes, be considered as a citizen of the State in which it is
carrying on business.
These are the three methods by which the jurisdiction of the circuit
courts of the United States, in respect to the subject-matter, is proposed
to be diminished. There is another provision in the bill, in relation to the
removal of causes from State to Federal courts. The provisions of the
bill take away all right on the part of the plaintiff in a suit to remove his
cause from a State to a Federal court after he has elected the forum in which
to bring suit. The bill further provides that wherever the cause of action
1970]
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These italicized words were deleted by Senate amendment without de-
bate.'54 Although this legislative history does not appear in the record of
Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank,' 55 deletion of this proposal reveals
that the Court was on target when it concluded that Congress meant to
eliminate removal on the basis of a federal defense when it amended the
Act of 1875 in 1887-1888 to allow removals from a state court to be
made by defendants of suits "of which the Circuit Courts of the United
States are given original jurisdiction by the preceding section. .. ."
Although the rule precluding removal on the ground of a federal
defense remains in effect, the American Law Institute recommends' 5
legislation that would, with some important exceptions, permit removal on
this basis.
D. Well Pleaded Complaint Rule-Original and Removal Jurisdiction
When Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian sr was decided in
1936, as previously indicated, removal on the basis of a federal defense
was no longer permitted. Hence, removal in that case hinged on whether
the federal court would have had original jurisdiction. Plaintiff tax col-
lector sued for taxes imposed by the state on defendant bank's predecessor
and alleged that defendant was under contract to pay. Since defendant and
its predecessor were national banks, the state could not have levied the
taxes without congressional authorization. Because Congress had autho-
rized the tax, the defendant contended that there was a federal question
involved and that it was entitled to remove the case to the federal court.
Mr. Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, denied removal on the ground
arises under the Constitution of the United States, or a law or treaty thereof,
the defendant who is sued in a State court upon such a cause of action may
remove the cause to a Federal court, provided he shall make it appear to
the court in which the case is pending that his defense depends upon a
proper construction of the Constitution of the United States, or some law
or treaty thereof.
Id. 613-14.
'' 18 CONG. REc. 2542 (1887).
152 U.S. 454 (1894).
15 ALL, STUDY OF THE DivisioN OF JURISDIcTION BETWEEN STATE AND FED-
ERAL COURTS § 1312, at 25-27 (1969). Currently, removal based on a federal
defense is permitted in several special acts. For example, transactions growing out
of international or foreign banking, 12 U.S.C. § 632 (1964) ; federal reserve banks,
28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1964); federal officers, examined pp. 17-20 supra; and the Civil
Rights Removal Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1964), recently construed in City of
Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966) and in Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S.
780 (1966).1
- "299 U.S. 109 (1936).
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that the tests to invoke federal jurisdiction under the Act of 1875 had not
been met. He stated the rules as follows:
How and when a case arises "under the Constitution or laws of the
United States" has been much considered in the books. Some tests are
well established. To bring a case within the statute [i.e., Act of 1875],
a right or immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United
States must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff's cause of
action.... The right or immunity must be such that it will be supported
if the Constitution or laws of the United States are given one con-
struction or effect, and defeated if they receive another.... A genuine
and present controversy, not merely a possible or conjectural one,
must exist with reference thereto, . . . and the controversy must be
disclosed on the face of the complaint, unaided by the answer or
petition for removal .... Indeed, the complaint itself will not avail as
a basis of jurisdiction in so far as it goes beyond a statement of the
plaintiff's cause of action and anticipates or replies to a probable de-
fense .... 158
Obviously, these well-established tests were not met. A suit on a contract
to establish liability to pay a state tax which Congress authorized does not
present a federal question in the complaint. At most, according to the
Court, a federal law was "lurking" in the background.
The narrow tests developed for the Act of 1875 serve to prevent the
federal courts from being flooded with cases such as Gully. On the other
hand, the Act of 1875 serves an important function as will be illustrated
in the following sections.
E. Function of the Act of 1875
To invoke jurisdiction under the Act of 1875, it is necessary to hurdle
the jurisdictional amount requirement imposed by Congress which was
initially over $500 increased to over $2,000 in 1887; to over $3,000 in
1887; and, in 1958, to the current figure of over $10,000. If this require-
ment is met, the judicial tests of the "well pleaded complaint rule," sum-
marized in the Gully case, 59 provide an additional hurdle. Unless both
tests are met jurisdiction over federal questions is left exclusively to the
state courts except in those instances where Congress has enacted a special
statute with less exacting requirements. A notable example of a special
statute is the Act of 1871-presently codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its
1 Id. at 112-13.
Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
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jurisdictional companion 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)-which does not require
any jurisdictional amount in civil actions:
To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or im-
munity secured by the Constitution of the United States, or by any
Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States.
Notwithstanding the limitations on the Act of 1875, many civil actions
qualify under it. Expanded federal constitutional rights coupled with a
growing number of state and federal laws serve to increase the case load
of the federal courts under the Act of 1875. The result has been further
Congressional and judicial limitations. The function of the Act of 1875
and further limitations on it are taken up in the following sections:
(1) State Action
a. Impairment of Obligation of Contracts
In the early years many civil actions were brought under the Act of
1875 in which it was alleged that state law impaired the obligation of con-
tracts in violation of article I, section 10, clause 1 of the Constitution which
forbids any state to pass a "Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."1 10
Currently, this is not a fertile source of federal question jurisdiction,
perhaps because states no longer pass laws which contravene this Consti-
tutional provision. 6 '
b. Public Utility Rate Cases
For approximately a quarter of a century, the Act of 1875 provided
the jurisdictional basis for a large volume of litigation involving an attack
on state rate orders on the ground that such rates violated the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution. In 1890, the Court declaredl' 2 that the
reasonableness of rates was a matter for judicial review under the due
process clause. In 1894, the Court held'0" that the eleventh amendment
did not bar a suit against state officials who undertook to enforce rates
"'E.g., Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg, 185 U.S. 65 (1902); Pen-
noyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891).
"' A more recent case is Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299
(1952).
..2 Chicago, M. & St. P.R.R. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
... Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894).
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alleged to violate the Constitution. In 1898, the Court upheld 64 the lower
court which had issued an injunction against the enforcement of a state
statute fixing rates for railroads on the ground that the statute violated the
fourteenth amendment. In 1908, in the famous case of Ex parte Young165
the Court reiterated that federal courts had authority to enjoin state
officials from enforcing a state rate statute which was found to violate the
fourteenth amendment. Shortly after the decision in EX parte Young,'66
the Court held that state administrative remedies must be exhausted be-
fore an injunction would be issued against state administrative action.'67
In Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.,'68 decided in 1909,
the Court said the following about jurisdiction under the Act of 1875:
The Federal questions, as to the invalidity of the state statute because,
as alleged, it was in violation of the Federal Constitution, gave the
Circuit Court jurisdiction, and, having properly obtained it, that court
had the right to decide all the questions in the case, even though it
decided the Federal questions adversely to the party raising them, or
even if it omitted to decide them at all, but decided the case on local
or state questions only.
State officials and representatives of the public were highly critical
of judges of the lower federal courts for enjoining state rate orders."6 9
In 1910 Senator Overman observed that "there are 150 cases of this
kind now where one federal judge has tied the hands of state officers, the
governor and the attorney-general .. ."1" Congress responded by re-
quiring a three-judge court'7 ' in an action for an interlocutory injunction
to restrain the act of any officer of a state under a statute alleged to violate
the Constitution. In 1934 Congress passed the Johnson Act m which
withdraws jurisdiction from the federal courts in cases involving a state
rate order when such order does not interfere with interstate commerce;
when the order is made after reasonable notice and hearing; and when a
104 Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
100209 U.S. 123 (1908).
100 Id.107Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
108213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909).
.
0
. Lilienthal, The Federal Courts and State Regulation of Public Utilities, 43
HARv. L. REv. 379, 420-21 (1929).1 45 CONG. REc. 7256 (1910).
... Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 557. This Act was subsequently
expanded and is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).
1'"Now 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1964). Comment, Limitation of Lower Federal
Court Jurisdiction over Public Utility Rate Cases, 44 YALE L.J. 119 (1934).
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plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the issuing state's courts.
Congress thus severely limited the function of the Act of 1875 in this
area and rerouted most public utility rate cases back to the state court for
initial determination of federal questions involved in them.
c. State Taxes
In 1907 the Court upheld17 3 jurisdiction of the lower court to issue an
injunction against enforcement of a state tax law on the ground that it
violated the fourteenth amendment. The Court itself imposed restrictions
on the exercise of jurisdiction under the Act of 1875 in these tax cases.
Equity jurisdiction should not be exercised, according to the Court, 1 4
where there was an adequate remedy at law in the state courts. Further,
the Court adopted 7 5 a strict test for jurisdictional amount by requiring
that the amount of the tax would control rather than a more lenient test
such as the right of the plaintiff to do business free of the tax. In 1937
Congress passed the Tax Injunction Act7 6 which provides:
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assess-
ment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain,
speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such state.
This statute does not preclude a declaratory judgment proceeding, but the
Court, nevertheless, withholds7 7 this type of relief where the state court
provides an adequate remedy for the taxpayer to question the validity of
the tax. Occasionally, the Court finds that a state remedy is not adequate.
In such cases, the Tax Injunction Statute does not apply, and jurisdiction
may be exercised under the Act of 1875 to grant an injunction 7 8 or issue
a declaratory judgment 79 provided, of course, the jurisdictional amount 8 0
is present.
"" Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20 (1907). Mr. Justice
Holmes dissented: "So far as I know this is the first instance in which a Circuit
Court has been authorized to take jurisdiction on the ground that the decision of a
state tribunal [Board of Equalization] was contrary to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Id. at 41.
.. Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932).
"'
T Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 (1934).
1 8 Now 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964).
" Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
... Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952).
... Town of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946).
8 Alterman Transp. Lines v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 259 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.




d. Other Illustrative Cases
Jurisdiction has been exercised under the Act of 1875 to contest the
following: state legislation on the ground that it was an undue burden on
interstate commerce,' a zoning ordinance alleged to contravene the
fourteenth amendment,' a governor's orders alleged to be an invasion
under color of state law of rights secured by the fourteenth amendment,8 3
and a state statute'84 alleged to violate the privileges and immunities clause
of the Constitution.
e. Abstention
A plaintiff seeking to attack the validity of a state statute on the
ground that it violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States may have no difficulty in meeting the jurisdictional requirements
of the Act of 1875. However, if there are questions of state law that may
be dispositive of the case, he may be wiser in choosing to litigate in the
state court rather than the federal court. If he chooses the federal court,
he may be introduced to a judicially created rule stemming from Rail-
road Commission v. Pullman Co. 8 which requires the federal trial court
to abstain 8 6 from exercising jurisdiction while the plaintiff goes to the
state court to seek a resolution of uncertain state law. In Reetz v.
Bozanichs'7 plaintiffs attacked a statute of Alaska regulating fishing li-
censes alleging that it violated both the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment and also the constitution of Alaska. A three-judge
district court did not think that this was a proper case for abstention even
though the Alaska Court had not passed on the state constitutional issue.
The trial court proceeded to find the statute unconstitutional and enjoined
its enforcement. In proceeding to try the case on the merits, the trial court
was of the opinion that the Alaska court would not uphold the statute and
that delay inherent in abstention would result in the plaintiffs losing an
opportunity to engage in their occupation of fishing during the forth-
coming season. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed and held that the
trial court should have stayed its hand while the plaintiffs went to the state
181 McNeill v. Southern Ry., 202 U.S. 543 (1906).
... Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
18' Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
... Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, rehearing denied, 335 U.S. 837 (1948).
188312 U.S. 496 (1941).
188 For an excellent discussion of "The Abstention Doctrines," see C. WRIGHT,
LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTs § 52 (2d ed. 1970).
187397 U.S. 82 (1970).
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courts for a resolution of their state constitutional questions. The con-
sequence of the plaintiffs choosing the federal court rather than the
state court probably means that, for some time, they will be litigating
rather than fishing.
The Court is usually not reluctant to require district courts to deal
with uncertain questions of state law when jurisdiction is based on di-
versity,18 but it is unwilling for the trial courts to do so when jurisdiction
is invoked under the Act of 1875. So long as this dubious distinction
exists, a prudent plaintiff will choose a state court and thus avoid being
sent to it via a federal court.
(2) Federal Government Action
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 applies only to state action. Congress
has not enacted a comparable special statute providing for jurisdiction in
the federal courts to contest the validity of federal government action.
Thus the Act of 1875 must be relied upon for federal jurisdiction in this
important class of cases. But the jurisdictional amount requirement in
the Act of 1875 leads to the incongruous result that Congress has left
exclusive jurisdiction in the state courts initially to adjudicate claims
of deprivation of constitutional rights by the federal government where
the amount involved does not exceed $10,000. This jurisdictional amount
obstacle can be hurdled in a case such as Powell v. McCormack8 9
where back pay was sought in a suit alleging that Congress could not
exclude from its ranks a duly elected member who met the age, citizen-
ship, and resident requirements specified in the Constitution. Cases such
as Lamont v. Postmaster General9 ° might pose a serious jurisdictional
amount problem. However, in that case the Court upheld the plaintiff's
assertion that his first amendment rights were violated because federal
law required him to request delivery of unsealed communist propaganda
mail before he was entitled to receive it, and nothing was said about juris-
dictional amount. In Flast v. Cohen"' the Court expressly lowered the
barrier erected in Frothingham v. Mellon 9 2 against "standing" of a
188 Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943). But see Louisiana Power
& Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (state law unclear in an
eminent domain case).
189395 U.S. 486 (1969).
19 381 U.S. 301 (1965). See also Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728
(1970) (upholding validity of 39 U.S.C. §4009 providing a procedure for an
addressee to stop delivery of specified types of mail).
181392 U.S. 83 (1968).
192 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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taxpayer to attack the constitutionality of an appropriation act of Congress,
but no light was shed on how the plaintiffs could hurdle the jurisdictional
amount obstacle. In Oestereich v. Selective Service Systom Local Board
No. 11,193 the Court rendered an opinion on the merits of the plaintiff's
claim for a pre-induction judicial review. It concluded with the following
statement:
We accordingly reverse the judgment and remand the case to the
District Court where petitioner must have the opportunity to prove
the facts alleged and also to demonstrate that he meets the jurisdictional
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 [Act of 1875].194
Lower federal courts'95 subsequently have found the required jurisdic-
tional amount in pre-induction cases.
In Giancana v. Johnson'9 6 plaintiff sought to enjoin an F.B.I. agent
from interfering with his civil rights. The court of appeals dismissed for
lack of jurisdictional amount. The plaintiff should have tried the back
door approach to the federal court. Had he started in the state court,
the defendant, a federal officer, according to custom, would probably have
removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1442. No jurisdictional amount is required
in this special removal statute.
In 1958 when Congress raised the jurisdictional amount from over
$3,000 to over $10,000 for both the Act of 1875 and diversity cases, the
Senate Report stated:
The jurisdictional amount should not be so high as to convert the
Federal courts into courts of big business nor so low as to fritter away
their time in the trial of petty controversies. 197
10 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
10
, Id. at 239.
105E.g., Walsh v. Local Board No. 10, 305 F. Supp. 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(judicial notice of the pecuniary rewards of a college education); Murray v.
Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.I. 1969) (loss of opportunity to teach music).
judge Medina said: "It is an unfortunate gap in the statutory jurisdiction of the
federal courts that our ability to hear a suit of this nature depends on whether
appellants can satisfactorily show injury in the amount of $10,000 but the fact
remains and on remand the District Court must determine this question." Wolff
v. Selective Serv. Local Board No. 16, 372 F.2d 817, 826 (2d Cir. 1967) (foot-
note omitted).
1"0 335 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1001 (1965). See
Arnold, The Power of State Courts to Enjoin Federal Officers, 73 YALE L.J. 1385
(1964). Should a state court take the view that it had no jurisdiction to enjoin acts
of a federal officer, the derivative jurisdiction doctrine would dictate no jurisdiction
in the federal courts on removal.
"'7 U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS 3101 (1958).
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This Senate Report focuses on property rights and does not take into
account human rights frequently involved in litigation under the Act of
1875. There is no sound reason why the jurisdictional amount required
in diversity cases should always be included in the Act of 1875. In order
to provide a federal forum for alleged violations of constitutional rights by
the federal government, the Court, in cases involving rights not readily
susceptible of evaluation in monetary terms, must either be very lenient in
finding the jurisdictional amount or overlook the requirement altogether. 08
Federal courts should have concurrent jurisdiction with state courts in
all civil actions contesting the validity of federal government action.
This will be accomplished if Congress accepts the recommendation 00 of
the American Law Institute to eliminate the jurisdictional amount require-
ment in the Act of 1875.
(3) State Created Rights
Although a right of action may be state created, jurisdiction may exist
under the Act of 1875 provided that federal law has "inserted itself"
into the texture of state law. 0 ° This situation is illustrated in Smith v.
Kansas City Title & Trust Co."'1 in which a shareholder sought to enjoin
his corporation from investing in farm loan bonds issued by Federal Land
Banks on the ground that Congress did not have the authority to authorize
the issuance of the bonds. The Court upheld jurisdiction under the Act
of 1875 on the ground that the controversy between the shareholder and
the corporation was over the validity of an act of Congress directly drawn
in question and that the decision of the case depended upon the determina-
tion of this issue. In this unusual case federal law was in the forefront
and not "lurking" in the background.
I98In order to avoid the jurisdictional amount requirement in the Act of 1875,
a lower court has resorted to 28 U.S.C. § 1361 which provides the federal courts
with jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus. Walker v. Blackwell, 3-60 F.2d
66 (5th Cir. 1966).
"go ALl, STUDY OF THE Divisiox OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
CouRts § 1311, at 24-25 (1969). A recent case vividly illustrates the wisdom of the
ALl proposal. In Goldsmith v. Sutherland, 426 F.2d 1398 (6th Cir. 1970), the
plaintiff sought to enjoin an order excluding him from a military reservation on
the ground that it was unconstitutional. The court of appeals held that the district
court properly dismissed the action for a lack of jurisdiction because it did not
appear to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy was present.
200 Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 450 (1955). Mr. Justice Brennan dis-
senting in Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 659 (1963).
2o 255 U.S. 180 (1921). Mr. Justice Holmes dissented on the ground that the
cause of action was created by state law.
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F. Conclusion on the Act of 1875
The Act of 1875 has been strictly construed except in the removal of
federal charter cases and in finding jurisdictional amount in civil actions
contesting the validity of federal government action. In rejecting the
contention that federal admiralty law is a "law of the United States"
within the meaning of the Act of 1875, Mr. Justice Frankfurter writing
for the Court stated:
The Act of 1875 is broadly phrased, but it has been continuously con-
strued and limited in the light of the history that produced it, the
demands of reason and coherence, and the dictates of sound judicial
policy which have emerged from the Act's function as a provision in
the mosaic of federal judiciary legislation. It is a statute, not a Constitu-
tion, we are expounding.
The considerations of history and policy which investigation has
illuminated are powerfully reinforced by the deeply felt and traditional
reluctance of this Court to expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts
through a broad reading of jurisdictional statutes.202
Although logic supports the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Telephone & Tele-
graph Co. 03 that "federal common law" is a law of the United States
within the meaning of the Act of 1875, history does not teach that the
Supreme Court will approve. It is one thing for the Court to apply the
federal common law to decide a dispute where jurisdiction has been spe-
cifically authorized by Congress,"' but it is quite a different matter to find
"federal common law" and then to use it as a basis to create juris-
diction under the Act of 1875. The Erie"-' Doctrine which declared that
the decisions of state courts were "laws" within the meaning of the
Rules of Decision Act260 logically should be negotiable in construing
the word "laws" in the Act of 1875,07 but history and pragmatism will
202 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 (1959).
202 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
... Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (Labor Man-
agement Relations Act of 1947, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964)); Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (United States a party).
20' Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
"'
0Now 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964).07 ALI, STUDY OF THE DivisioN OF JURISDIcTIoN BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COUETS 180 (1969) states: "[I]t seems probable that the Court would hold that
the 'laws' referred to in the statute are not confined to Acts of Congress but include
also such 'federal common law' as may exist outside of admiralty or maritime mat-
ters."
19701
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probably dictate otherwise. Erie did not enlarge federal jurisdiction.
Ivy would.
The Act of 1875 serves a limited 0 but useful function. It provides
the jurisdictional basis for contesting certain state and federal government
action which could not otherwise be litigated in the lower federal courts.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the Federalist Papers Alexander Hamilton wrote:
When... we consider the State governments and the National gov-
ernment, as they truly are, in the light of kindred systems, and as parts
of ONE WHOLE, the inference seems conclusive, that the State
courts would have concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under
the laws of the Union, where it was not expressly prohibited.20
From the beginning state courts have played a vital role in deciding
federal questions." 0 The Act of 1875 did not take away state court juris-
diction. Rather, it permitted the federal courts to share some of it with
the state courts. Today the state courts have exclusive jurisdiction to
decide any federal question which cannot meet the jurisdictional require-
ments of the Act of 1875 unless, of course, Congress has by a special act
conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts. Frequently special acts
conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts to enforce specific federal
rights also provide for concurrent jurisdiction in the state courts. Even
when Congress decides to reserve jurisdiction exclusively to the federal
courts, as in patent and copyright infringement cases, practicality has
dictated that state courts may decide infringement "questions" as dis-
tinguished from "cases." 2"' Since state courts are courts of general juris-
diction, the tests for civil actions "arising" under the Act of 1875 do not
apply.
.08 In 1969 there were twenty-eight reported decisions in the federal district
courts involving the Act of 1875. jurisdiction was present in twenty-two of those
cases. Of the fourteen cases decided in the courts of appeals, nine were dis-
missed for a lack of jurisdiction. In 1968 a total of 197,811 bankruptcy cases were
filed. REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE, UNITED STATES COURTS 88 (1968).
o'THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 514 (B. Wright ed. 1961).
=10 Occasional efforts by a state court to prevent review of federal questions by
the Supreme Court are thwarted. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
211 Conversely, even where federal jurisdiction exists solely because of a federal
question, federal courts in the interest of "judicial economy" decide questions of
state law. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1964) (claim
of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under the
copyright, patent, or trademark laws).
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Congress was wise to rely on the state courts to have an important role
in the federal question jurisdiction family. It is unlikely that Congress
will either curtail the federal question jurisdiction of state courts or sig-
nificantly expand original or removal jurisdiction of the federal courts by
amending the Act of 1875. Hopefully, however, Congress will eliminate
the jurisdictional amount requirement in that Act. Also, special federal
question jurisdiction to enforce federally-created rights should continue
to grow. Congress will enact new laws creating new federal rights.
Whether this jurisdiction is concurrent or exclusive it will result in an
increase in the business of the federal courts.
